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President George Bush had a few choice words for Canada's Foreign Affairs minister, 
Maxime Bernier, when he saw his official companion, Julie Couillard. 
"Well, well, well," Mr. Bush said, "haven't you been keeping good company." 
The president was probably referring to Couillard's attractiveness, but it very well might 
have been to her controversial ties to the Hells Angels as world leaders are generally well 
briefed about all types of issues. 
For instance, Pierre Trudeau's wife, Margaret, was briefed by the Canadian ambassador to 
Moscow about the women she would meet when the prime minister made his first historical 
visit to the Soviet Union in 1971. 
Such "briefing notes" can be quite candid. Mrs. Brezhnev is a "homely, rather hefty person 
who knows she is married to the boss," with a "rather flashy" divorced daughter. 
"Although dumpy and rather unattractive looking, Mrs. Gromyko has a great deal of natural 
charm and is a very intelligent woman." 
Mrs. Gvishiani "is by far the most attractive Russian woman in the hierarchy." 
They "all share a certain sense of inferiority" and "none of them seems particularly involved 
or interested in her husband's political life." 
Briefing notes help world leaders navigate complicated situations and formulate responses 
to perplexing situations. Top-secret briefing notes generally remain classified, despite the 
20- and 30-year rules that govern access to Canadian government documents. 
We will probably never learn what was in the package of information and briefing notes 
about the NATO summit in Bucharest in April that Mr. Bernier carelessly left behind. But we 
can guess about their likely content as leaders at the Riga summit faced more than seven 
controversial issues. 
The issue of burden sharing in Afghanistan would have required that Foreign Affairs 
Minister Bernier know which countries are becoming more reluctant to contribute forces. 
Who doesn't want to contribute any more forces at all? 
The controversial issue of NATO enlargement, and questions surrounding possibly 
accepting Ukraine but bypassing Georgia, would have been examined in light of strong 
Russian opposition, especially by Russian president Vladimir Putin, to NATO expansion. 
Internal reaction within NATO to a controversial report by five retired high-ranking NATO 
officials and generals on the prospects of a more global NATO partnership, possibly 
including Australia and Japan, would no doubt have been brought to his attention. 
An internally-driven review by NATO's secretary-general of NATO's Strategic Concept, 
which nobody can reach any agreement about, might have been explained in light of 
domestic opposition from a range of Canadian NGOs opposed to relying upon nuclear 
deterrence. 
Facts about the hundreds of tactical nuclear weapons that remain in Europe under NATO 
auspices might have been revealed, including news about a possible American strategy of 
negotiating a reduction or quid pro quo in Russia's tactical arsenal in exchange for 
withdrawing the European nuclear weapons entirely. 
Mr. Bernier assuredly would also have been brought up to speed about behind-the-scenes 
attitudes toward the tremendously problematic issue of re-integrating France into NATO's 
force structure and planning. France is often privately considered more of a threat to 
NATO's internal harmony than Russia. 
Moreover, how might the United States and Canada cope with currently stymied plans to 
set up a European crisis management force of 60,000 personnel, which would essentially 
compete with NATO for European citizen's allegiance? 
In short, the Canadian government's favoured approaches to all these controversial issues 
would probably have been explained, attacked and defended in the information package 
that Bernier left in Couillard's apartment. 
Of great concern to the NATO alliance, Mr. Bernier's briefing package may well have 
included some analyses by Canadian officials from different departments of highly-classified 
guidance issued by the NATO Council, NATO's Military Committee, or NATO's Nuclear 
Planning Group, which secretly discusses the use and introduction of nuclear weapons. 
Information emanating from NATO headquarters is considered to be so secret that it is 
usually never declassified. Cabinet documents that refer to other countries' decision-making 
about NATO issues are whited out for pages at a time. For example, the minister of Foreign 
Affairs Mitchell Sharp advised the Cabinet in September 1968, 50 years ago, that he had 
been handed an aide-memoire by the (whited out) setting out how the (whited out) 
government considers the alliance should react to Soviet aggression against 
Czechoslovakia. Their secret Cabinet discussions considered the option of doing nothing 
because they could not come to a decision about the level of Canadian military participation 
in NATO. Fast-forward 50 years later and the same sort of Cabinet discussion may have 
already taken place in Harper's Cabinet regarding Afghanistan prior to the NATO Summit. 
That is why former ministers of Foreign Affairs, like Mitchell Sharp, Joe Clark, Barbara 
McDougall, and Lloyd Axworthy, are all sworn to Cabinet secrecy because leaks about 
Cabinet discussions can irreparably damage governments. 
A possible leak from this package could damage Canada-U.S. relations. For example, a top 
secret foreign policy strategic overview in 1986 pointed out that in response to efforts to 
inject increases into the U.S. defence budget, "there has developed a strong Congressional 
lobby determined to ensure that the USA's allies assume their fair share of defence 
expenditures.... The House of Representatives and Senate reportedly have recent studies 
which identify Canada and Japan, in particular, as being deficient in their contributions to 
defence." 
We cannot know whether Mr. Bernier's briefing package contained similar types of 
complaints by the U.S. about Canada or other countries. 
What would create a crisis, however, would be hard evidence that the Manley report—which 
insistently recommended an additional contribution of 1,000 forces to Afghanistan from 
other NATO countries—was a deliberately-contrived upon demand. Did the independent 
panel and high-level Canadian officials know well before the NATO Summit of pending 
American plans to contribute 1,000 Marines to Afghanistan? 
The "news" that Prime Minister Harper's demand for 1,000 more troops at the NATO 
summit was just a face-saving public relations exercise, not an honest appeal, might 
adversely affect average voter's perceptions in the fore-run to a Canadian federal election. 
But information that American officials in Washington deliberately took part in such a plan in 
order to prop up the Harper government's public persona through NATO deliberations 
would probably exert a larger impact. 
Due to their potentially-damaging international and national implications, many high-level 
policy-makers around the world must be hoping right now Mr. Bernier's briefing notes were 
not leaked to the Hells Angels (or any journalists bent on hellfire). 
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